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Chapter 7
Nonmaleﬁcence
This is an important obligation in morality and medical ethics (doing no harm). It is
associated with the maxim “primum non nocere,” above all do no harm. In Islamic
teachings Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said, “Doing harm and reciprocating harm
is not allowed” [1]: “La Dharar wa la Dhirar.”
In Islamic jurisprudence axioms: “Avoiding harm takes precedence over
bringing good.” It simply means if a certain action end in both good and harm, then
it is preferable ﬁrst to thwart off harm. However, if the beneﬁt is much greater than
the harm, then that action could be applied. Al Izz ibn Abdul Salam (d660H/1262
CE) a renowned Islamic jurist in his book “Qawaeed AlAhkam” “Basics of
Rulings” said “The aim of medicine is to preserve health, restore it when it is lost;
remove ailment or reduce its effect. To reach that goal it may be essential to accept
the lesser harm, in order to ward off a greater harm, or lose a certain beneﬁt to
procure a greater one” [2].
He also said, “Medicine in the Sha’riahis regarded as a ﬁeld that brings the
beneﬁts of health and wards off the harms of disease and ailments” [2].
The axioms of warding harm in Islamic jurisprudence are:
(1) Doing harm and reciprocating harm is not allowed.
(2) Harm should be warded and avoided as much as possible.
(3) All that is harmful is prohibited in Sha’riah. That will involve medicines
made from porcine material, alcohol, carrion (dead animals) or seeking
remedy by amulets, sorcery, and divination. Any mode of treatment that
causes harm without any good is not allowed. Similarly if the harm is more
than the beneﬁt, or even if the expected harm is equal to the expected good, it
is not allowed. However, if the expected beneﬁt is greater than the harm, then
it is allowed. If a patient is having a gangrenous foot or limb, and the
gangrene might increase and even kill the patient, then it is allowed to
amputate the limb. Similarly if a woman is pregnant and continuation of
pregnancy is threatening her life, then she is allowed to abort. If the con-
tinuation of pregnancy is going to endanger her health, but not her life, or the
fetus is grossly malformed, then abortion is allowed prior to ensoulment, i.e.,
in the ﬁrst 120 days computed from time of fertilization of the ovum (i.e.,
conception) which is equivalent to 134 days from last menstrual period
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(LMP) which is used by obstetricians, and that is equivalent to
19 weeks + 1 day [3]. But it is not allowed to have abortion after that date.
Yet it is possible to have preterm delivery, e.g., 36 weeks or even less if
deemed necessary.
(4) If there is certain harm, then it should be removed.
(5) Harm should not be removed by another harm, which is equivalent to the
previous harm; or worse if it is removed and replaced by a worse harm.
However, if the harm cannot be removed except by accepting a lesser harm,
then the lesser harm is accepted. This follows the next axiom.
(6) The greater harm could be replaced by a lesser harm. Examples of this in
medicine is amputation of a limb, if gangrene is spreading; or accepting to
use narcotics to relieve pain, even if morphine and its derivative have a
double effect, i.e., the debilitated patient suffering from pain due to metastasis
and chronic pulmonary disease where morphine and its derivatives is going
to depress the respiratory center in the medulla in the brain stem, and
therefore may end in respiratory failure. The serious side effect in such a
patient would be accepted if the pain was not relieved except by the narcotic.
The dose should be the minimum required to alleviate pain. Muslim jurists in
the past brought the case of a man who adopted Islam. He was required to
circumcise his prepuce, but if that was going to harm him (there was no
proper anesthetic), then he was allowed to pray and do all the required
worship of Islam without circumcision.
The balancing of harms is important in Islamic jurisprudence, and if it is
impossible to thwart harm, without causing another harm, then the lesser
harm should be accepted.
(7) The prohibited things would be allowed if there is necessity. If a person is
lost in the desert and he is thirsty and he ﬁnds only alcoholic beverages, e.g.,
wine, then he is allowed to drink it to quench his thirst. Similarly, if he has no
food, and only ﬁnds pork or carrion (dead meat), or blood, then he is allowed
to eat it to save his life. But he is not allowed to kill another human being (a
child or diseased weak person) in order to save his life. He can kill any
animal that he ﬁnds or even eat the corpse of an animal or, worse, the corpse
a human if there is no alternative.
In medicine the same rules may apply. Taking medicine made of porcine
material or alcohol or poisonous snakes is allowed if there is no alternative
medicament.
Similarly, autopsy and dissection of human bodies would be allowed in
(i) Coroners’ cases, i.e., medicolegal cases ordered by the magistrate in
order to reveal the cause of death or help in identifying the perpetrator
(ii) To teach anatomy, physiology, and pathology which are needed to
bring up physicians and health providers [4].
It is allowed to take an organ from a living donor if such donation is
not going to harm the donor seriously. The donor should be adult
competent and donating by his free will [5].
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If the person is deceased (brain dead), then organs could be taken if he
had agreed during his lifetime to donate, or his family has agreed to
donate after his death [5]. The consent should be informed and no
selling or bargaining is involved. The government can encourage
donation by giving medals, free medical services, or even a ﬁxed
amount of money. This is still debatable in the West, but it is practiced
in Iran and Saudi Arabia [5].
(8) As long as harm continues, it cannot be ignored. So long as the harmful effect
is there, then it should be removed. Whatever system is there that involves
harmful effects, then that harm should be removed out of the system.
Otherwise the whole system should be changed. If in a certain community all
foreigners ofﬁcially residing in a country are not covered by health insurance
or health services, that system should be changed.
(9) The harm befalling a whole community is worse than the harm falling an
individual. The general harm should be warded off ﬁrst. If the general harm
cannot be prevented unless it affects few, then the general harm should be
prevented, even if it involves one or few individuals.
(10) If there are two harms, then the lesser harm could be done if it is impossible
to ward off both harms.
(11) If there are two beneﬁts, then the higher beneﬁt should be obtained, even if it
involves losing the lesser one.
(12) If both harm and beneﬁt are involved, then try to get the beneﬁt and refuse
the harm. If that is not possible and the beneﬁt is much greater than the harm,
then accept the lesser harm. However, if the harm is equal or even more than
the beneﬁt, then refuse the harm even if it means loss of the beneﬁt.
(13) “Legal permission negates tortious liability,” except in cases of flagrant
negligence. These rules have great bearing in medical practice from both the
ethical and legal points of view. The law differentiates between crime and
tort.
Crime is a legal wrong, the remedy of which is the punishment of the offender at
the instance of the state. It can be deﬁned also as a legal wrong that can be followed
by criminal proceedings, which result in punishment [6].
Tort is the law of damages; the civil law of liability is not designed to punish
anyone, punishment is the function of the criminal law, compensation is the
function of civil law (tort) [7].
The Sha’riah combines both the civil law (tort) and the criminal law. An act can
be either a civil wrong or a crime, or can be both [8].
Similarly, an act may be morally wrong but is not punishable by law.
Some moral philosophers combine nonmaleﬁcence with beneﬁcence in a simple
principle. “William Frankena, for instance, divides the principle of beneﬁcence into
four general obligations, the ﬁrst of which we identify as the obligation of
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nonmaleﬁcence and the other three of which we refer to as obligation of beneﬁcence”
as Beauchamp and Childress say in “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” [9]. These are:
(1) One ought not to inflict evil or harm
(2) One ought to prevent evil or harm
(3) One ought to remove evil or harm
(4) One ought to do or promote good
Frankena arranges these elements serially, so that other things are equal in a
circumstance of conflict. The ﬁrst takes precedence over the second, the second
over the third, and the third over the fourth [9].
It is amazing to ﬁnd a saying of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) ordering Muslims
to:
(i) Do and promote good
(ii) Remove evil or harm
(iii) Prevent evil or harm and enjoin doing good and preventing harm, and
(iv) The least thing one can do is not to inflict harm [10].
In another tradition, he told his companions not to stay in public way (roads or
lanes), they said we have to stay there. He said if that is so then give the public way
its rights. They exclaimed, “What are the rights of the way?,” he said: “Not to stare
at people (passing by); do no harm, greet people, enjoin right and forbid wrong;
guide those who lost their way and help those who are in need [11].”
Muslim jurists, as already mentioned, put thwarting harm, removing harm, and
not doing harm as more important than bringing beneﬁt (good), unless the beneﬁt is
so great that the harm could be accepted in order to obtain this great beneﬁt.
Beauchamp and Childress [9] said: “Obligation not to harm others (e.g. those
prohibiting theft, disablement and killing) are distinct from obligation to help
others.”
“Obligation not to harm others are sometimes more stringent than obligations to
help them, but obligations of beneﬁcence are also sometimes more stringent than
obligations of nonmaleﬁcence.” The obligation to rescue an injured or dying person
is deﬁnitely more important than giving alms to the needy or even if it involves
doing a minor harm to a person.
Generally, nonmaleﬁcence is more important than beneﬁcence.
The authors (Beauchamp and Childress) put the following arrangement:
Nonmaleﬁcence: [1] one ought not to inflict evil or harm.
Beneﬁcence: [2] one ought to prevent evil or harm, [3] one ought to remove evil
or harm (both 2 and 3 could be also included in nonmaleﬁcence), [4] one ought to
do or promote good
The Glorious Qur’an is full of verses ordering Muslims to enjoin what is right
and forbidding what is wrong, e.g.…
Surah 3/104: “And let there be from you a nation inviting to good, enjoining
what is right and forbidding what is wrong; and those will be the successful.”
Surah 3/110: “You are the best nation produced for mankind. You enjoin what is
right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah.”
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Surah 3/114: Describes the believers, “They believe in Allah, and the Last Day,
and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and hasten to do good deeds. And
those are among the righteous.”
Surah 16/90-91: “Indeed, Allah orders justice and good conduct, and giving to
relatives and forbids immortality and bad conduct and oppression. He admonishes
you that perhaps you will be reminded. And fulﬁll the covenant of Allah you have
taken and do not break oaths after their conﬁrmation, while you have made Allah,
over you, a security (i.e., witness). Indeed Allah knows what you do.”
Surah 2/177: “Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the East or
West (in prayers), but (true) righteousness is one who believes in Allah, the Last
Day, the Angels, the Books, and the Prophets and gives wealth in spite of love for
it, to relatives, orphans, the needy, the traveler (way farer), those who ask (for help)
and for freeing slaves; who fulﬁll their promise when they promise, and who are
patient (i.e.. forebear) in poverty, hardships and during battle. Those are the ones
who have been true, and it is those who are righteous.”
Surah 31/17-19: “O my son, establish prayer, enjoin what is right, forbid what is
wrong, and be patient over what befalls you … and do not turn your cheek (in
contempt) toward people, and do not walk through the earth exultantly. Indeed
Allah does not like every one self deluded (conceited) and boastful. And be
moderate in your pace, and lower your voice; indeed, the most disagreeable of
sounds is the voice of donkeys.” Many other verses/ayas order enjoining the right
and forbidding the wrong, e.g., Surah 7/157, Surah 9/71, Surah 29/45.
Preventing evil or harm and removing it when it is there can also be considered
as a type of beneﬁcence. Beneﬁcence is not limited to doing or promoting good, but
deﬁnitely will involve preventing or removing harm.
Harm is not limited to physical harm; it involves harm to reputation, property,
privacy, and liberty. Omar ibn AlKhattab (the 2nd Caliph) ordered a poet called
alHutta’ia to be imprisoned as he in one of his poems inflicted harm on alZubraqan
by saying, “Do not travel and toil to do the magnanimous act, but stay in your
locality for food, drink and dress.” This was considered libel, and hence he was
imprisoned. The Arabs considered libel worse than killing if it was said in poetry, as
the Arabs were fond of poetry and learning it by heart; and the whole nation will
know about it.
Negligence and the Standard of Due Care
“Obligations of nonmaleﬁcence are not only obligations of not inflicting harms, but
also include obligation of not imposing risks of harm. A person can harm or place
another person at risk without malicious or harmful intent” [9].
Unintended harm should be compensated in both Sha’riah and Civil Law,
though there is no punishment. If a person aims at animal (game), but the bullet or
arrow struck unintentionally a human being, then the perpetrator should pay a blood
ﬁne (100 camels or its value plus freeing a slave. If that is not available he should
fast for two consecutive months). The blood ﬁne should be paid by the Aqila, i.e.,
the male members of the tribe, as it is almost impossible to be paid by the per-
petrator, unless he is wealthy. This system of Aqila changed at the time of Omar ibn
7 Nonmaleﬁcence 123
alKhatab, the second Caliph, as whole tribes were dispersed in different places
ﬁghting the Roman and Persian Empires. He created the Diwan, i.e., the registry,
taking note of the people who live together and get their pay from one government
source. The jurists of today accepted the insurance, as both the Aqila and Diwan are
no more in existence [12].
Health providers should pay compensation if their actions of medical or surgical
treatment resulted in harm. However, if side effects of the management occur, then
the competent physician should be considered not liable. The legal Islamic axiom
“Legal Permission negates tortuous liability.” Ibn alQayim in his book “Tibbi
Nabawi” (The Medicine of the Prophet) [13] said: The Practitioner (attabib) who is
well trained, alert, and keen is the one who has done his job well. He was autho-
rized by the state and had the consent of the patient. Despite that his patient
succumbed or there was damage to a part or to one or more of his senses, such a
practitioner is not liable. This is the view of almost all jurists (fuqaha) of all the
schools of Islamic ﬁqh (jurisprudence). Ibn AlQayim then brings the position of the
person who claims to be a physician, but he neither had proper training nor had
been authorized to practice medicine. Then he should be liable according to the
saying of the PBUH. “That who practices medicine without due knowledge is
liable.” But if the patient knew that he is not authorized to practice and gave him
consent, then the patient himself is responsible of the outcome. However, if the
patient thought he is an authorized physician then that person (the quack) is liable.
AbdulMalik ibn Habib alBeiri (Andalusia) said: “Not only he should be liable and
pay the compensation but he should be punished for practicing without due
knowledge and not being authorized” [14].
If the person is qualiﬁed to practice medicine, but he did not obtain consent from
his patient or his guardian (if he is incompetent or a minor), then he may be liable
unless it is an emergency to save a life or a limb or thwart a serious damage.
However, ibn alQayim thinks it may be said he is (i.e., the practitioner) is only
trying to do good and God says, “There is no blame for those doing good (or
intending to do good),” [Surah 9/91] as God is Forgiving and Merciful.
However, the other jurists agree that if the practitioner caused harm (uninten-
tionally), then he is liable and should compensate. If the compensation is 1/3 of the
Diyah (blood ﬁne: the value of 100 camels), then it should be paid by the practi-
tioner himself, but if it is more than 1/3 of the Diyah, then it should be paid by the
Aqila, or if not available, then it should be paid from the public funds. Jurists of
today agree to a type of insurance [12].
All jurists agree that if there is blatant negligence, even if the practitioner is a
highly qualiﬁed and well-known physician, then he will be liable.
Negligence is the absence of due care. In the profession of medicine, it involves
a departure from the standard care. The more senior the person, the more respon-
sible he becomes and if a minor mistake is forgiven from a junior, such a mistake
may not be forgiven for a consultant. Negligence usually occurs due to lack of
proper care, and therefore, considered unintentional (inadvertent). However reck-
less, blatant negligence is considered in the civil law as intentional (advertent).
Thus, for example, the mistake that occurs in the case of operating on the normal
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limb instead of the diseased one, or operating in the normal eye or ear instead of the
diseased one. Forgetting surgical instruments, cotton, or swabs in the wound
without removing it and stitching over it resulting in serious sequelae. Such prac-
tices are not very rare and hence the perpetrator is liable and compensation
(indemnity) is required. Other disciplinary measures may be taken, e.g., suspension
of the authorization of practice, or even canceling it completely if the horrible
mistake is repeated by the same person. Surgeons who perform surgery after
drinking alcohol are more liable to succumb to these horrendous mistakes.
Professional malpractice is an instance of negligence. If the physician does not
follow the professional standards, he may be considered liable. However, if there is
harm despite the health provider following the standard care required by his pro-
fession, then he is not liable. Negligence cannot be imputed because a cure is not
affected. The practitioner should put his effort and knowledge to cure the disease, if
possible, but he cannot guarantee cure, or even improvement of the malady, even if
the disease is known to be curable. The patient’s immune system may be weak, the
microorganism may be more virulent, or the drug used caused an unexpected side
effect or allergic reaction.
The practitioner has to do his duty by providing required care, and by following
the standards of the profession. The implied contract with the patient does not
include a promise to effect a cure; and negligence cannot be imputed because cure is
not effected [9].
To win a negligence case it is necessary to prove the duty of care, the standard of
care given (should be acceptable by professional peers), and the injury that was
caused by the failure to practice properly [15].
Beauchamp and Childress [9] put the following essential elements to prove
negligence:
(1) The professional must have a duty to the affected party.
(2) The professional must breach that duty.
(3) The affected party must experience harm.
(4) The harm must be caused by the breach of duty.
The question of end-of-life treatment will be discussed in a separate chapter in
detail. The salient points in this regard are:
(a) It is not imperative on a Muslim to seek remedy except in life-saving situa-
tions, and where the illness is due to infectious bugs (microorganisms) for
which treatment is available. The patient should be treated, even against his
will, if he is going to infect other people.
(b) Stopping (withdrawing) or not starting (withholding) certain types of man-
agement are allowed in the following cases:
(i) Brain dead cases ﬁrmly diagnosed;
(ii) If the treating physicians ﬁnd a certain modality of treatment useless
(futile), or going to increase the suffering of the patient;
(iii) Stopping certain measure that support life (withdrawing) or not start-
ing these measures (withholding), e.g., Do Not Resuscitate or Do Not
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Intubate measures are accepted if the decision is reached by at least
three competent specialist physicians as ordered by the Fatwa of the
Permanent Commission for Research and Endowment No. 12086
dated 28/3/1409 (1989) which allowed withholding and withdrawing
life support if decided by at least three competent specialist physicians.
This medical decision should be fully explained to the family, but it
remains a medical decision [16].
The question of artiﬁcial feeding of comatose or persistent vegetative states, by
intravenous or by nasogastric tube, is a point of contestation in the West. There are
many who considered it as a type of treatment, and hence could be futile. Many
courts allowed stopping sustenance technology (i.e., nutrition and hydration by
artiﬁcial means). The ﬁrst one was the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976 that it
was permissible for a guardian to disconnect Karen Ann Quinlan from respirator
and allow her to die. However, she lived for 10 years after disconnection of res-
pirator, but continued her sustenance (nutrition and hydration) by tubes [9].
Several Roman Catholic moral theologians advised the relatives that they were
not morally required to continue medically administered nutrition and hydration
(MN & H) or antibiotics to ﬁght infections.
The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed withdrawal of MN & H in 1985 from
an 84-old person in a nursing home suffering from debilitated disease who had been
on artiﬁcial feeding for many years.
A Massachusetts court reached a similar decision in Brophy case, a 49-year-old
man who was in persistent vegetative states for 3 years in 1986 [17]. Courts since
then viewed MN & H as a medical procedure subject to the same evaluative
standards as other medical procedures, and thus allowed stopping sustenance
(nutrition and hydration) and letting the patient die.
It is a horrible type of death as it takes 10 to 14 days to die suffering from hunger
and thirst. These poor patients do not die in peace, as alleged by the perpetrators,
and it would be less painful by injecting drugs that would end the suffering in a few
minutes.
We are not endorsing euthanasia, but this type of dying is worse than euthanasia,
as they will not suffer the agony of being deprived of nutrition and hydration.
In Islamic jurisprudence preventing nutrition and hydration, is a clear case of
murder, that would be punished by Qisas (capital punishment unless the awliya
agree to pardon or take blood ﬁne, i.e., diya).
The case of Theresa Schiavo (Born December 1963 and died by stopping
nutrition and hydration March 31, 2005). She was married to Michael Schiavo in
1984, suffered cardiac arrest in 1990 and as sequelae suffered from brain damage
(persistent vegetative state). The court appointed Michael Schiavo her husband as
Terri’s guardian. Michael Schiavo received $250,000 in an out of court settlement
with a physician for malpractice. A trust fund was set up for her treatment
$750,000, and Michael Schiavo received another $300,000 for loss of consortium.
The Schindlers, her parents, attempted to remove Michael Schiavo as Terri’s
guardian, but failed (1993). Michael Schiavo ﬁled a petition with the court to have
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PEG (for feeding and fluids) tube removed. The Schindlers (the parents) opposed
the petition.
After a long battle in which President Bush and his brother Jeb Bush (the
Governor of Florida) and the Pope tried hard to continue hydration and nutrition of
Terry Schiavo; the court insisted on removing the feeding tube and Terry Schiavo
died after 2 weeks. Her death was announced on March 31, 2005.
Michael Schiavo got 1 million dollars in life insurance of his deceased wife.
On January 26, 2006, Michael Schiavo married his girlfriend with whom he had
two children.
The ethical, moral, and legal problems are mounting due to this policy of
stopping hydration and nutrition to patients in persistent vegetative state, or ter-
minally ill patients.
They will soon ﬁnd that euthanasia is less painful and less harmful than this
drastic inhumane death by stopping nutrition and hydration, and they will resort to it.
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